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Attachment I

OUTLINE FOR JUSTIFICATION OF SECURITY LIST ITEMS

(To be followed in documenting items for Technical Manual, and to be used as basis for justifying revisions or additions of security list items.)

Definition of Items

List No.

A. Description

1. State what the item is if not fully explained by the definition itself, or if this is a new item, and describe important variations in grade, size, or model of the item.
2. Identify the more important elements covered by the definition, i.e., 50,000 and 25,000 KW generators although the definition covers those of 500 KW and over.
3. Tell what it does, or how it is used operationally, and what advantages or disadvantages it has over other items, with similar or closely allied uses.
4. To what extent is highly skilled labor needed?
5. What level of technology is required in its production?
6. Give examples of its use in U.S. industry and other CoCon countries.

B. Strategic Significance (Describe in sufficient detail to make an impressive statement)

1. Military uses by the Soviet Bloc.
2. Results of analysis of captured enemy equipment
3. Direct U.S. military, AE, BV or CW uses of the item, if there are any
4. Other strategic uses, including AE, BV and CW
5. What strategic materials or strategic component parts are used in its production?

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B. (Continued)

To what extent are these materials used? i.e., are they essential or can they be substituted satisfactorily?

C. Sources of Supply Outside the Soviet Bloc

1. Which non-Soviet countries produce the item, and which are the chief producers quantitatively?
2. Which non-Soviet countries produce the best grades or models of the item?
3. Which non-Soviet countries export the item, and which are the major exporting countries?
4. Which non-Soviet countries export the item to the various countries in the Bloc, and is this a traditional trade pattern or a recent development?
5. What is extent of U.S. exports of the item to the friendly country exporting the same item to the Bloc?

D. Soviet Bloc Needs and Availabilities (including Communist China and North Korea)

1. In which countries of the Bloc is the item produced, and in what quantities?
2. Indications of accumulated stocks, if any.
3. Indications of shortage of supply, if any, in various countries of the Bloc.
 - (a) Statistics on imports under Lend Lease, and statement regarding Soviet shortage during World War II;
 - (b) Statistics on imports into the Bloc during 1951, and during the first six months of 1952, by Soviet Bloc country of destination, or if statistics are not available, a general statement as to which countries in the Soviet Bloc probably import the item from the outside.

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- (c) Statements concerning (1) the degree of urgency of Soviet attempts to procure the item outside the Bloc, (2) whether or not the Soviets offer premium prices or offer strategic goods in exchange for it, and (3) whether or not the Soviets try to buy the item outside the Bloc by indirect means through middlemen or third countries.
 - (d) Any other statements concerning a shortage in supply: (1) of the item, (2) of basic materials needed for its production, (3) (if the item is a piece of machinery or equipment) indications of shortages in the goods manufactured on this machinery.
 - (e) Indications of Soviet weaknesses in production of the item or of items closely related to it, as for example, deficiencies in quality, or shortages of skilled labor or technical personnel.
4. If no evidences of shortage can be listed, as suggested above, have domestic Soviet requirements for the item been met in the past year from indigenous production without imports from outside the Bloc and without diminution of stocks? (answer this separately for the USSR, the European satellites and China, if possible).
5. Can Soviet domestic requirements for the item be met during the coming year from indigenous production without imports from outside the Bloc, without diminution of stocks or without diversion of manufacturing facilities from other important activities? (Answer this separately for the USSR, the European satellites and China, if possible).
6. During a full-scale war, if all supplies from outside the Bloc were cut off, which, if any countries of the Bloc would be short of the goods manufactured on the item? How soon would such a shortage occur, and how serious would be the effect on the prosecution of the war?

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RATING CRITERIA

Although the CoCom countries have not formally established rating criteria they have taken note of criteria that guided the United States, United Kingdom and France in Tripartite negotiations on the strategic lists. The Tripartite notes were based on the U.S. criteria.

EMBARGO CONTROL (I/L I, US I AND US 1A)

(Following are the US 1A criteria, which are in substance the same as those noted by CoCom for I/L I).

Class 1A includes all materials or equipment which may contribute to the war potential of the Soviet Bloc to such a great extent that no export of such materials or equipment should be permitted to the Soviet Bloc.

One of the following criteria must be met for Class 1A:

- (a) Materials or equipment which are designed or used principally for the production and/or development of arms, ammunition and implements of war.
- (b) Materials or equipment which would contribute significantly to the war potential of the Soviet Bloc where the items incorporate advanced technology or unique technological know-how. It applies only to goods sufficiently important to the war potential of the Soviet Bloc that the absence of an embargo would permit a significant advance in Soviet Bloc technology over its present level of development.
- (c) Materials or equipment which would contribute significantly to the war potential of the Soviet Bloc in that the items, if embargoed, would maintain or create a critical deficiency in the war potential of the Soviet Bloc.

The United States has adopted the following explanatory notes for use by the U.S. only:

1. Criteria (b) and (c) may be qualified in cases where the materials or equipment are available from outside the controlled areas (the U.S., ERP countries and any other

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1. (continued)

countries that control exports to the Soviet Bloc) in quantities sufficient to meet the import demands of the Soviet Bloc, and on conditions as to quality of product and timing of delivery approximating those obtaining in the controlled area.

2. Where a materials or equipment item on the IA List includes more and less advanced types, and only the more advanced types fall under criterion (b) above, a cut-off point should be established and the IA rating applied to the types above the cut-off point under this criterion. Where such a cut-off point cannot be established, the items should be rated 1B and in licensing, applications for exporting the more advanced types to the Soviet Bloc should be denied.

QUANTITATIVE CONTROL (I/L II, US II AND US IIB)

Items which are highly important from the point of view of their contribution to the war potential of the Soviet Bloc and of which the high strategic character is directly related to the quantitative extent to which they may be exported to the Soviet Bloc. The export of items in class IIB from the United States should be restricted to the smallest possible consistent with the overall policy.

The last sentence in the quantitative criterion is, of course, eliminated from the international criterion.

EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION (I/L III)

Items of potential strategic significance for which information presently available on the Soviet Bloc needs is insufficient to establish clearly the necessity for control on types indicated.

The CoCom countries have taken note of the following in connection with all criteria:

The words "war potential" used in the above criteria should be interpreted as meaning the following: War potential is to be viewed from both the short term and the long term aspects. It includes (a) items of direct military application. It may also include amongst others, selected items which represent (b) sectors of industry in which strategic and industrial interests are very closely mingled and where the items concerned can easily and

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quickly be turned over from peaceful uses to the manufacture of war equipment or other direct military application; and (c) other industrial fields which serve to support the basic economy of a country and which therefore support either a peacetime or wartime economy.

US LIST IC

List IC includes materials and equipment (not on U.S. List I, II, IA or IIB) which may support military activity, and the export of which to the Soviet Bloc should be restricted.

The US IC list has not been submitted to other nations.

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